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INTRODUCTION

The possibility of holding a State responsible for acts of domestic
violence has been recognized in the Inter-American system since the first
decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, VeldsquezRodriguez v. Honduras.' Veldsquez-Rodriguez, as with most cases in the
Inter-American system, concerned actions perpetrated by State agents.
Nonetheless, since Veldsquez-Rodriguez, the court has consistently held
that States may be held responsible for acts perpetrated by private
individuals when the State does not comply with its duty to ensure human
rights.2 Regarding this duty, the court held that "[s]tates must prevent,
. Patricia Tarre Moser earned her law degree from the Universidad Central de
Venezuela and an LL.M in international human rights law from the University of Notre
Dame. Ms. Tarre Moser is a lawyer at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
The opinions expressed on this article do not reflect the opinions of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights or its registry. The author would like to thank Rose Rivera for
her valuable comments.
1. Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 194 (Jul. 29, 1988).
2. Id. T 164; see also, e.g., Perozo v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 195, T 298 (Jan. 28, 2009);
Ximenes Lopes v. Brazil, Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 149, 125 (Jul. 4,
2006); Pueblo Bello Massacer v. Colombia, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 140, 1 113
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investigate and punish any violation of the rights recognized by the
Convention and, moreover, if possible attempt to restore the right violated
and provide compensation as warranted for damages resulting from the
violation."3 The court further affirmed that these obligations also apply to
"illegal act[s] [that] violate human rights and [that are] initially not directly
imputable to a State."A Domestic violence, as an act that potentially
violates the right to personal integrity and the right to life, under certain
circumstances, falls within this category. Consequently, the State has
international obligations associated with the occurrence of domestic
violence within its borders; the duty to prevent, investigate, punish, and,
when possible, repair the harm. All of these duties may be referred to as
the general duty to ensure human rights.
Unfortunately, State responsibility for failure to comply with the duty to
ensure human rights is not clearly applied in many cases; one of the
principal reasons for this is because few cases in the Inter-American system
have concerned acts initially committed by private individuals. However,
this is not the only reason. Even though the possibility of holding a State
responsible for acts initially perpetrated by private individuals was alluded
to in the first case ever decided by the court in Velazquez-Rodriguez, a
concrete case within the Inter-American jurisprudence has not applied the
implications of the Velazquez-Rodriguez decision until recently. 5 The best
examples of this evolution are two cases of domestic violence: Maria da
Penha Maia Fernandesv. Brazil and JessicaLenahan (Gonzales) v. United
States.'
In both cases of domestic violence, the Inter-American Commission
found the State responsible for violating human rights.7 Interestingly, the
analysis utilized to attribute responsibility to the State for the private acts
was completely different between both cases. In Maria da Penha, the
Commission only explored how the lack of an official investigation
violated the victim's right to judicial remedy and to a fair trial. In
contrast, the Commission in Lenahan analyzed the State's obligation to
prevent the severe domestic violence that was at issue and to investigate the
facts; consequently, the Commission concluded that the State's failure to
(Jan. 31, 2006).
3. Velasquez-Rodriguez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser C) No. 4,
4. Id. 172.

166.

5. Id. 176; see, e.g., Lenahan v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n
119 (2011); Maria da Penha v. Brazil, Case 12.051, InterH.R., Report No. 80/11,
Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 54/01, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.1 11 doc. 20 rev. 27 (2001).
6. Maria da Penha, Case 12.051, Report No. 54/01, 26; Lenahan, Case 12.626,
Report No. 80/11, 119 & n.201
199; Maria da Penha, Case
7. See Lenahan, Case 12.626, Report No. 80/11,
12.05 1, Report No. 54/01, 60.
8. Maria da Penha, Case 12.051, Report No. 54/01, 60.
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prevent and investigate violated the victim's right to life. 9 The
Commission's analysis in Lenahan regarding the duty to prevent also
shows the evolution in case law regarding the standard used for the duty to
prevent since it uses the theory of foreseeable risk.10 The objective of this
Article is to analyze the different reasoning used in Maria da Penha and
Lenahan, and explain the significance of this variance in an analysis for
future cases of domestic violence within the Inter-American System.
First, this Article explains the facts and the Commission's legal analysis
in Maria da Penha and Lenahan and briefly describes the different
approach taken by the Commission in each case. Second, this Article
analyzes the evolution in the case law that led to the recognition that a
State's failure to prevent and investigate could constitute a violation of
Third, this Article examines the standard the
substantive rights.
Commission utilized in analyzing the duty to prevent in Lenahan and
describes the theory of foreseeable risk, how it has been used, and the role
it played in the Lenahan case. Finally, this Article discusses the theory of
foreseeable risk, its application to cases of domestic violence, and the
significance of this development in the jurisprudence of the Inter-American
system.
This Article concludes that the recognition of substantive rights may be
violated by the failure of the State to prevent and investigate, and that the
use of the theory of foreseeable risk constitutes a significant step forward in
clarifying the obligation of States to fight domestic violence. Finding a
State responsible for failing to prevent, pursuant to the theory of
foreseeable risk, implies that the State knew or ought to have known there
was an imminent risk of domestic violence, and in the face of this
foreseeable risk, the State failed to take action. This lack of prevention
might be considered the equivalent of acquiescence pursuant to the
definition of torture in the United Nations Convention Against Torture
(UNCAT)." Consequently, this evolution could, and hopefully will, result
in a recognition in the Inter-American System that in certain circumstances
domestic violence constitutes torture.
I. THE Two CASES
The Commission decided the case of Maria da Penha in 2001 .2 The
case concerned the attempted murder of the victim and other aggressions
9. See Lenahan, Case 12.626, Report No. 80/11, 164.
10. See id.T 147.
11. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46, at 197 (Dec. 10,
1984) (stating torture means intentional infliction of pain and suffering as a form of
punishment, interrogation, or coercion).
12. Mariada Penha,Case 12.05 1, Report No. 54/01, 160.
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by her husband, which resulted in the victim becoming paraplegic. 13 At the
moment of the Commission's decision, seventeen years after the crime, the
State had still not sentenced Maria's husband.14 The Commission analyzed
whether this period of time was reasonable and determined that it was
not.15 The Commission held that "the judicial delay and long wait for
decisions on appeals reveal conduct on the part of the judicial authorities
that violates the right to prompt and effective remedies provided for in the
Declaration and the Convention." 6 The Commission concluded that this
was a violation of the Convention, specifically article 8 concerning the
right to fair trial, and article 25 concerning judicial protection, in relation to
article l(l)." Additionally, the Commission determined that Brazil's
actions in this case were "part of a general pattern of negligence and lack of
effective action by the State in prosecuting and convicting aggressors" of
domestic violence.' 8 The Commission held that the existence of this
pattern of tolerance of domestic violence constituted a violation of the duty
to "condemn all forms of violence against women" established in article 7
of the Convention of Bel6m do Pard.
Although the petitioners mentioned State tolerance of the aggression and
failure to prevent the actions, they did not demand a declaration of the
violation of their right to personal integrity pursuant to article 5 of the
Convention. 20 Nevertheless, even though the petitioners were not obliged
to declare which of their rights were violated, the Commission decided
issues of law beyond what the parties alleged. 2 1 Thus, the Commission
13. Id 2.
14. Id. 38.
15. Id. T 39-44.
16. Id. 41 (referring to the American Convention on Human Rights (Convention)
and American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (Declaration),
38respectively). A prompt remedy must take place within a reasonable time. Id.
39. To determine whether the time period within which proceedings take place is
reasonable, four elements must be taken into account: the complexity of the matter, the
procedural activity of the interested party, the conduct of the judicial authorities, and
"the adverse effect of the duration of the proceedings on the judicial situation of the
person involved in it". See Valle-Jaramillo v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 192, T 155 (Nov. 27, 2008). On the other hand,
an effective remedy is a remedy that is "capable of producing the result for which it
was designed." Veldsquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 66 (Jul. 29, 1988).
17. Maria da Penha, Case 12.051, 44.
18. Id 56.
19. Id. 54, 58.
20. Id. 2, 26.
21. Id. TT 56-58. See generally L.M. v. Paraguay, Petition 1474-10, Inter-Am.
38 (2011)
Comm'n H.R., Report No. 162/11, OEA/Ser.L./V/II., doc. 69 rev.
("Neither the American Convention nor the IACHR Rules of Procedure require a
petitioner to identify the specific rights allegedly violated by the State in the matter
brought before the Commission, although petitioners may do so. It is for the
Commission, based on the system's jurisprudence, to determine in its admissibility
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could have examined a possible violation of Maria's right to personal
integrity. The Commission did conclude that there was a general
obligation to prevent, investigate, and punish acts of domestic violence.22
Nonetheless, since the Commission did not examine these obligations as
part of the duty to ensure the right to personal integrity, it did not determine
that the lack of compliance with these obligations violated Maria's right to
personal integrity.
On the other hand, in Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States, the
Commission referred to the killings of three girls, Leslie, Katheryn, and
Rebecca Gonzalez. 23 The girls' parents had divorced, and the mother,
Jessica Lenahan, had a restraining order against her ex-husband. 2 4 MS.
Lenahan contacted the police on several occasions to report that her
daughters were missing, that she thought the girls' father took the girls, and
that this was a violation of the restraining order.2 5 Hours later, the father
drove to the police station, and there was a shootout between him and the
police.26 Immediately after, the police found the corpses of the three girls
in their father's car. 27
The subsequent investigations did not completely clarify whether the
girls were killed before or during the shooting at the police station. 2 8 MS.
Lenahan filed a suit against the City of Castle Rock and several police
officers for failing to enforce the restraining order.2 9 The case reached the
United States Supreme Court.30 The United States Supreme Court held that
the police had no specific obligation to enforce a restraining order,
reasoning that a "well established tradition of police discretion has long coexisted with apparently mandatory arrest statutes."
Since the United States has not ratified the American Convention on

report which provisions of the relevant Inter-American instruments are applicable and
could be found to have been violated if the alleged facts are proven by sufficient
elements."). Previously, the Commission analyzed this situation considering the iura
novit curia ("the court knows the law") principle. See, e.g., Mois6s v. Peru, Case
11.016, Inter-Am. Comm'n H. R., Report No. 44/01, OEA/Ser.L./V/II. 111, doc. 20 rev.
36 (2001); Jos6 do Egito Romlo Diniz v. Brazil, Petition 262-05, Inter-Am. Comm'n
H.R., Report No. 6/10, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, Doc. 69 rev. 4 (2010).
22. Mariada Penha, Case 12.051, Report No. 54/01, $T 55-56.
23. Lenahan v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No.
80/11, % 24, 32 (2011).
24. Id 62.
25. Id
26. Id.

71.

81.

27. Id.

28. Id.

82-85 (noting that the autopsy failed to "identify which bullets, those of

the [police] or Simon Gonzales, struck Leslie, Katheryn, and Rebecca Gonzales").
29. Id. 37, 86.
30. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales (Gonzales IV), 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
31. Id. at 760; see also Lenahan, Case 12.626, Report No. 80/11, 1 90.
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Human Rights, the obligations examined by the Commission in Lenahan
were those found in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man.3 2 The Commission examined whether the State had the state
apparatus necessary to prevent domestic violence and whether it had
exercised due diligence in preventing the killings.33 The Commission
determined that "[t]he state apparatus was not duly organized, coordinated,
and ready to protect these victims from domestic violence," and that the
State had not acted diligently in this case in particular.34 Thus, the
Commission found that the United States violated its obligation to protect
the victims from discriminatory acts as well as violated the victims' right to
life.35
Under the right to judicial protection, the Commission analyzed the
obligation to clarify the cause, time, and place of the deaths of Leslie,
Katheryn, and Rebecca Gonzales, as well as communicating the findings of
the investigation to their families. As a result, the Commission determined
The
that the United States failed to comply with those obligations.1
Commission also held that the United States violated the right to judicial
protection since "the State authorities have [not] undertaken any inquiry
into the response actions of the Castle Rock police officers in their contacts
with Jessica Lenahan."3 The main difference between the two cases is that
the Commission in Lenahan analyzed the substantive right affected, the
right to life, while the Commission in Maria da Penha did not analyze the
right to physical integrity, the substantive right affected in that case.
Consequently, while the Commission in Lenahan analyzed the duty to
prevent domestic violence as part of the duty to ensure the right to life, the
Commission in Maria da Penha did not. Neither of the two cases
examined the duty to investigate and punish as part of the duty to ensure
the right to life and the right to physical integrity.
II. PROCEDURAL OBLIGATIONS

The first case of the Inter-American Court, Velasquez-Rodriguez,
established that there is a general duty to "prevent, investigate, and punish
any violation of the rights recognized by the [American Convention on
Human Rights] and, moreover, if possible attempt to restore the right
violated and provide compensation as warranted for damages resulting

32. See Lenahan, Case 12.626, Report No. 80/11,

4.

33. Id. TT 138, 140, 159.
34. Id 160.

35. Id. $$ 160, 170.
36. Id. 196.
37. Id

180.
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from the violation."38 In that same case, the court determined that this
general duty applied to all the rights included in the Convention.3 9
Nonetheless, as described in a prior section, this theory was not concretely
applied right away. Instead, as seen in Maria da Penha, a case of State
failure to investigate or punish those responsible for domestic violence, the
Commission and the court only declared a violation of the right to judicial
protection and the right to a fair trial for failure to investigate.
The Inter-American Court first applied the court's reasoning in
Velasquez-Rodriguez in a 2003 case, Sanchez v. Honduras.40 The case

concerned the extrajudicial execution of the victim and the subsequent lack
of investigation. The court determined that Honduras violated the victim's
right to life by the extrajudicial execution itself as well as by the
subsequent lack of investigation. 4 1 The court based its analysis on a
previous decision of the European Court of Human Rights. 4 2 In Scinchez v.
Honduras, the court analyzed the lack of investigation of the killing as an
additional factor to the violation of the right to life and not as the only
action or omission causing state responsibility regarding the right to life, as
reflected in cases concerning deprivation of a victim's life by private
action.
Procedural obligations include the obligations to prevent, investigate,
punish, and, if possible, repair. 43 The theory and term is borrowed from the
European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter the European Court). 44 In
both systems, the procedural obligations were first recognized in cases
where state agents committed the violation of the substantive rights.4 5
Nevertheless, the European Court has since clarified that procedural
obligations exist even when the perpetrators are not state agents.46 "Nor is
38. Velisquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.

C) No. 4, 1 166 (Jul. 29, 1988).
39. Id.
40. Sanchez v. Honduras, Preliminary Objections, Merits, and Reparations,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 99, 112 (Jun. 7, 2003).
41. Id. 113.
42. See Jordan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24746/94, Eur. Ct. H.R., T 105
(2001), availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-59450.
43. See, e.g., Garibaldi v. Brazil, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 203, 1 23 (Sep. 23, 2009); Ergi v.
82 (1998), available at
Turkey, App. No. 23818/94, Eur. Ct. H.R.,
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-58200.
161
44. See McCann v. United Kingdom, App. No. 18984/91, Eur. Ct. H.R.,
(1995), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57943.
45. See Valle Jaramillo v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 192, 97 (Nov. 27, 2008); Sanchez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
112. In the case of the European Court, see Jordan, App. No.
(ser. C) No. 99,
24746/94, T 105; McCann, App. No. 18984/91, 161.
46. See Akkoq v. Turkey, App. No 22947/93 & 22948/93, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 97
(2000), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-58905;
82 (holding that this obligation is not confined to cases
Ergi, App. No. 23818/94,
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it decisive whether members of the deceased's family or others have lodged
a formal complaint about the killing with the relevant investigatory
authority."47 In addition, the Inter-American Court expressly recognized
that procedural obligations applied to actions initially committed by private
actors in Gonzcles v. Mexico (In re Cotton Field).4 8 Nonetheless, there is
still confusion surrounding the application of the procedural obligation. As
seen in Lenahan, for example, the duty to prevent was the only procedural
obligation applied, as the other obligations were treated as violations of the
right to judicial protection.49
The express recognition of the procedural obligations represents a major
improvement in the jurisprudence of the Inter-American System,
particularly for cases of domestic violence. Thanks to this recognition
there is a more clearly established duty to prevent domestic violence.
Additionally, this now means that the failure to investigate cases of
domestic violence constitutes a violation of the victim's right to personal
integrity.
III. THEORY OF FORESEEABLE RISK
The application of procedural obligations to private acts, and the
recognition of the duty to prevent in particular, has served to more clearly
define for the Inter-American system what the State must prevent.50 After
all, the State cannot be responsible for all crime committed in its territory;
instead, the duty to prevent is an obligation of conduct and not of result.
The analysis used by the Inter-American and the European Human
Rights System in relation to the duty to prevent is known as the theory of
foreseeable risk. 5 2 The theory of foreseeable risk establishes that for a
State to be responsible for a crime committed in its territory, four elements
where it has been established that the killing was caused by an agent of the State).
47. See Ergi, App. No. 23818/94,

82.

48. Gonzalez v. Mexico (In re Cotton Field), Preliminary Objections, Merits,

Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, 294 (Nov. 16,
2009).
49. Lenahan v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No.
80/11, TT 181, 196, 209 (2011).
50. See Rosa M. Celorio, The Rights of Women in the Inter-American System of
Human Rights: Current Opportunities and Challenges in Standard-Setting, 65 U.

L. REV. 819, 847 (2011) (indicating that the Cotton Field judgment, in
particular, "greatly contributes to the clarification of the scope and content of the
concrete responsibilities of states in individual cases of violence and discrimination
against women, especially when these acts are presumably perpetrated by private
individuals").
51. See, e.g., In re Cotton Field,Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, 280.

MIAMI

52. See Victor Abramovich, Responsabilidad Estatal por Violencia de Gdnero:
Comentarios Sobre el Caso "Campo Algodonero" en la Corte Interamericana de
Derechos Humanos, ANUARIO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS 167, 168 (2010), available at

http://www.feminicidio.cl/jspui3/bitstream/1 23456789/425/1 /Abramovich.pdf.
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must be present: (1) there must be a situation of real and immediate risk,
(2) this situation must threaten a specific individual or group, (3) the State
must know or ought to have known of the risk, and (4) the State could have
reasonably prevented or avoided the materialization of the risk.13
The Inter-American Court used the theory of foreseeable risk in relation
to the obligation to prevent private actions for the first time in the case of
Gonzales v. Mexico (In re Cotton Field).54 The case concerned the
The
disappearance of three women in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico.
disappearances occurred within a context of kidnappings and murders of
young women in Ciudad Juarez. 56 The bodies of the three victims in the
case were found in the same field some days or weeks after their
disappearance with marks of sexual abuse and inhuman treatment.
To analyze whether Mexico was responsible for the failure to prevent the
deaths of these victims, the court separated the events into two phases.
First, the court examined the duty to prevent the kidnappings of the
victims.5 9 Considering the existing pattern of disappearances and killings
of young women, the court established that the State was obliged to take
measures to prevent the kidnappings of women and violence against
women in general. 6 0 The court recognized that Mexico had already taken
some of these measures; however, it failed to prove their efficacy.6'
Notwithstanding, the court concluded that it was impossible for the State to

53. Id. at 174.

171-73. Before
54. See In re Cotton Field, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205,
this case, the court used the theory of the foreseeable risk in cases concerning
massacres executed by paramilitary groups in Colombia. Though paramilitary groups
were initially created by the State, by the time the massacres were examined, the
paramilitary groups were already considered illegal groups; thus, the theory of the
foreseeable risk was used to consider if there was an "accentuated responsibility." See,
e.g., Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 14, 134 (Jul. 1, 2006); Pueblo Bello
Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 140, T 126 (Jan. 31, 2006). The theory of the foreseeable risk was also
used in cases of indigenous communities to examine the alleged violation of the right
to life. For those cases, the violation of the right to life occurred as a result of lack of
medical care, among others, but not by private actors. See, e.g., Sawhoyamaxa
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, TT 155-180 (Mar. 29, 2006).
171-73.
55. In re Cotton Field,Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205,
56. Id. 122-23, 165-68.
57. Id. 209, 212.
58. Id. 281.
59. Id. T 249-96.

60. Id. J 252-58.
61. Id. % 262-79 ("Although the obligation of prevention is one of means and not
of results .

. . ,

the State has not demonstrated that the [measures taken], although

necessary and revealing a commitment by the State, were sufficient and effective to
prevent the serious manifestations of violence against women that occurred in Ciudad
Juirez at the time of this case.").
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prevent the kidnappings of these three women specifically. 6 2
The second phase concerned the obligation to prevent the inhuman
treatment and killing of victims after their families denounced their
disappearances. The court ruled that "given the context of the case, the
State was aware that there was a real and imminent risk that the victims
would be sexually abused, subjected to ill-treatment and killed." 63 This, the
court said, transformed the obligation into one of "strict due diligence."64
Since the State failed to comply with that obligation, it violated the victims'
rights to life, personal integrity, and personal liberty. 5
The difference between the two phases in Cotton Field demonstrates the
importance of the specification of the group in danger. In the first phase,
all unprivileged young women in Ciudad Juarez were at risk.66 The State
even had knowledge of the existence of the general risk and had started
taking preventing measures. 67 This may not mean, however, that the State
can be held responsible for all actions that fit within that pattern. 68 In this
first phase, the general risk is not specific enough, making it impossible for
the State to prevent all harm caused. While in the second phase, the
immediate risk to the specific victims was higher and the contextual
evidence demonstrated that the said risk was real.69 Hence, state action was
obligatory.
In Lenahan, the Commission also used the theory of foreseeable risk.70
The Commission first determined that "the issuance of this restraining
order and its terms reflect that the judicial authorities knew that Jessica
Lenahan and her daughters were at risk of harm by Simon Gonzales."
Consequently, when Jessica Lenahan told the police that her three
daughters were missing, three out of the four elements of the theory of
foreseeable risk were met; specifically, there was a situation of real and
immediate risk, the situation threatened a specific individual or group, and
the State knew or should have known of the risk. Thus, the only element
missing was whether the State could have reasonably prevented or avoided
the materialization of the risk. This last element, as is suggested by the
word "reasonably," is a due diligence obligation.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. 282.
Id. 283.
Id.
Id 286.

66. Id. 282.

67. Id.
68. Id

69. Id

283.

70. Lenahan v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No.
80/11,T 137 (2011).
71. Id. 141.
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To analyze this issue, the Commission examined the terms of the
restraining order since the Commission considered that the order was "an
indicator of which actions could have been reasonably expected from the
authorities."7 2 Subsequently, the Commission stated:
With respect to the question of which actions could have reasonably
been expected, the justice system included language in this order
indicating that its enforcement terms were strict; and that law
enforcement authorities were responsible for implementing this order
The order expressly mandates law enforcement
when needed.
officials-by employing the word "shall"-to act diligently to either
arrest or to seek a warrant for the arrest of the aggressor in the presence
of information amounting to probable cause of a violation. The order
authorizes and requires law enforcement officials to use every reasonable
effort to protect the alleged victim and her children from violence.73
Accordingly, the Commission indicated that the state agents should have
"understood that a protection order represents a judicial determination of
risk." 74 Thus, the Commission established that the state agents should have
known what their responsibilities were under the circumstances; should
have considered "the characteristics of the problem of domestic violence;
and [should have been] trained to respond to reports of potential
violations."75 The Commission then proceeded to analyze whether the
actions taken by the police amounted to a lack of due diligence and
determined that they did.
On the other hand, in Maria da Penha there is not enough information to
The
know whether the State should have prevented the attacks.77
against
violence
pattern
of
general
was
a
Commission did state that there
women.7 8 Nonetheless, as shown by Cotton Field, it is necessary for the
State to have knowledge of the particular risk.79 Since there is no
information on this issue in Maria da Penha, it is not possible to conclude
whether Brazil should have prevented the aggressions to Maria da Penha.
However, Brazil could still have been found responsible for violating the
right to personal integrity for the lack of investigation alone.80
72. Id. 143.
73. Id. 144.
74. Id. 145.
75. Id.

76. Id. TT 146-60.

77. See Maria da Penha v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report
No. 54/01, OEA/Ser.L./V/l. 111, doc. 20 rev. f 2-3 (2001).
78. See id. 56.
79. In re Cotton Field, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, 280 (Nov. 16, 2009).
80. The Inter-American Court has not yet declared the violation of a substantive
right for lack of investigation alone. Nonetheless, it is expected for the Court to do so
in Gonzcilez v. Venezuela, which is currently being analyzed by the Court and where the
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IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS EVOLUTION
The recognition of the duty to prevent domestic violence and the
application of the theory of foreseeable risk have created a standard that
States must meet and clarify as to what mechanisms should be in place to
prevent domestic violence. Even though investigation of domestic violence
is also necessary, the main objective should be towards preventing
domestic violence and human rights violations in general. This Article,
however, focuses on one specific legal consequence: recognizing domestic
violence as torture in the Inter-American System.
In the American Convention on Human Rights (American Convention),
the article referring to personal integrity establishes that "[n]o one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or
treatment."a As stated above, the Inter-American system has already
declared the violation of the right to personal integrity by actions initially
committed by private actors.82 Nonetheless, in those cases, both the court
and the Commission have failed to distinguish whether the acts amounted
to torture or not.
No definition of torture is included in the American Convention or the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (American
Declaration). 83 Nonetheless, the Inter-American system has a convention
specifically dealing with torture: the Inter-American Convention to Prevent
and Punish Torture (ICPPT).8 4 The ICPPT was adopted in 1985, just one
year after the United Nations' adoption of the UNCAT.85 Both the InterAmerican Commission and Court have jurisdiction to examine a violation
of the ICPPT. Article 2 of the ICCT establishes that
Commission found a violation of the right to life for lack of investigation.

See

GonzAlez v. Venezuela, Case 12.605, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 120/10,
159 (2011).
81. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art.
5(2), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
82. See, e.g., In re Cotton Field, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205,
413,
602(8); Ximenes Lopes v. Brazil, Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 149,
163,
262(2) (Jul. 4, 2006).
83. See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights
art. 5, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of Man art. XXV, Apr. 30, 1948, O.A.S. Res. XXX.
84. Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, Dec. 9, 1985,
O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 67.
85. Id.; see also Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
86. Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture art. 8, Dec. 9, 1985,
O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 67 (establishing that "[a]fter all the domestic legal procedures
of the respective State and the corresponding appeals have been exhausted, the case
may be submitted to the International Fora whose competence has been recognized by
that State"). This has been interpreted to mean that both the court and the Commission
have jurisdiction over the ICPPT. See Villagrin-Morales v. Guatemala (Case of the
247-48
Street Children), Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63,
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torture shall be understood to be any act intentionally performed
whereby physical or mental pain or suffering is inflicted on a person for
purposes of criminal investigation, as a means of intimidation, as
personal punishment, as a preventive measure, as a penalty, or for any
other purpose. Torture shall also be understood to be the use of methods
upon a person intended to obliterate the personality of the victim or to
diminish his physical or mental capacities, even if they do not cause
physical pain or mental anguish.87
To consider an act as torture, according to article 2, State involvement is
not required. Nonetheless, article 3 of the ICPPT states that
[t]he following shall be held guilty of the crime of torture: a. A public
servant or employee who acting in that capacity orders, instigates or
induces the use of torture, or who directly commits it or who, being able
to prevent it, fails to do so. b. A person who at the instigation of a public
servant or employee mentioned in subparagraph (a) orders, instigates or
induces the use of torture, directly commits it or is an accomplice
thereto.
After some back and forth on whether state involvement was required to
consider an act as torture,89 the court clearly determined the elements of
torture in the case of Bueno Alves v. Argentina, decided in 2007.90 In that
case, the court stated that "the elements of torture are as follows: a) an
intentional act b) which causes severe physical or mental suffering c)

(Nov. 19, 1999). See also Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights art. 23, approved by the Commission at its 137th regular period of
sessions Oct. 28-Nov. 13, 2009 (providing information regarding the jurisdiction of the
Inter-American Commission).
87. Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture art. 2, Dec. 9, 1985,
O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 67.
88. Id. art. 3.
89. The Commission first considered that State involvement was necessary to
consider an act as torture under the ICPPT. See Raquel Marti de Mejia v. Peru, Case
10.970, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 5/96, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.91 § V(B)(3)(a)
(1996). Then, the Commission eliminated the state involvement requirement. It is
necessary to mention, however, that all the cases where the Commission has done so
have also only concerned acts committed by state agents. See, e.g., Alfonso Martin Del
Campo Dodd v. Mexico, Case 12.228, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 117/09,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II, doc. 51 rev. 1 35, 77 (2009); Ferreira Braga v. Brazil, Case 12.019,
Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 35/08, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.134, doc. 5 rev. 1, 80,
84 (2008); Finca "La Exacta" v. Guatemala, Case 11.382, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R.,
Report No. 57/02, OEA/Ser.L./V/II. 117, doc. I rev. 1, 1 70 (2002); Jalton Neri Da
Fonseca v. Brazil, Case 11.634, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 33/04,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. 1,
63, 65 (2004); Abella v. Argentina, Case
11.137, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., OEA/Ser.L./V/II.98, doc. 6 rev.
232-33 (1997);
G6mez v. Mexico, Case 11.411, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 48/97,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.98, doc. 6 rev.
62-63 (1997); Hernandez v. Mexico, Case 11.543,
Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 1/98, OEA/Ser.L./V/1I. 102, doc. 6 rev. T 34, 56
(1998).
90. Bueno-Alves v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 164, 79 (May 11, 2007).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2013

13

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 7
JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

450

[Vol. 21:2

committed with a given purpose or aim." 91 In the footnote to this
statement, the court explained how this definition is in accordance with
precedent. 92 The Court's enumeration of the elements of torture in the case
of Bueno Alves is reiterated in subsequent cases decided by the court.93
Noticeably, there is no element of State involvement.
Severe domestic violence meets all the required elements elaborated in
Bueno Alves. 9 4 Consequently, the Inter-American System could simply
disregard the issue of State involvement without further consideration, as
has occurred in the area of International Criminal Law.95 In this way, the
Inter-American system could consider severe domestic violence to be
torture without considering the element of State involvement at all. This is
unlikely and probably unwise. If a violation of a State obligation is found
by a human rights court, it has to be as a result of a State action or
omission; courts do not have jurisdiction to rule on issues that are not
attributable to the respondent, a State party. This is a factor that is not
present in the area of International Criminal Law because liability is at
issue only for individuals, not States.
Accordingly, this Article examines how domestic violence might be
considered to be torture using the most internationally accepted definition
of torture, which does require state involvement. In this sense, the
definition of torture found in the UNCAT establishes that the act must be
"inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of
a public official or other person acting in an official capacity." 96 While
analyzing the meaning of this phrase, the Committee Against Torture
(CAT) stated in General Comment No. 2 to the UNCAT that
where State authorities . . . know or have reasonable grounds to believe

that acts of torture or ill-treatment are being committed by non-State
91. Id.

92. See id at 79 n.45; see also Cantoral-Benavides v. Peru, Merits, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 69, 97 (Aug. 18, 2000); Urrutia v. Guatemala, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 103, TT 91, 93 (Nov.
27, 2003); Tibi v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 114, 149 (Sept. 7, 2004).
93. See, e.g., Bayarri v. Argentina, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations,
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 187, T 81 (Oct. 30, 2008); Ortega
v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 215, T 120 (Aug. 30, 2010).
94. See Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic
Violence as Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 325-31 (1994).
95.See David Kretzmer, Prohibition of Torture, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA

14 (Rildiger Wolfrum et al. eds., online ed.,
2008), availableat http://www.mpepil.com.
96. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment art. 1.1, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW,
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officials or private actors and they fail to exercise due diligence to
prevent, investigate, prosecute and punish such non-State officials or
private actors consistently with the Convention, the State bears
responsibility and its officials should be considered as authors, complicit
or otherwise responsible under the Convention for consenting to or
acquiescing in such impermissible acts. Since the failure of the State to
exercise due diligence to intervene to stop, sanction and provide
remedies to victims of torture facilitates and enables non-State actors to
commit acts impermissible under the Convention with impunity, the
State's indifference or inaction provides a form of encouragement and/or
de facto permission.97
General Comments constitute non-binding interpretations made by a
committee of experts named by the State parties to the UNCAT." While
not binding, their opinions are valuable for the interpretation and
development of international law. 99 General Comment 2 is also supported
on similar grounds by different Special Rapporteurs,' 0 0 as well as
scholars.' 0 '
The interpretation of the CAT implies that a State has not acquiesced in
torture where it has complied with the obligation to prevent the act of
torture, the obligation to investigate the act, the obligation to prosecute the
act, and the obligation to punish the perpetrators.10 2 The existence of these
obligations is conditioned by whether the State has "reasonable grounds to
97. Committee Against Torture, General Comment No. 2: Implementation of

Article 2 by States Parties, 18, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CG/2 (Jan. 24, 2008).
98. CHRIS INGELSE, THE UN COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE: AN ASSESSMENT
150-51 (2001).
99. See id. For example, the manner the International Court of Justice treated
interpretations made by the Human Rights Committee of the application of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See Report of the Int'l Court of
Justice, TT 107-11, U.N. Doc. A/59/4 (Aug. 9, 2004); see also Human Rights
Committee, General Comment No. 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligation
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add. 13

(May 26, 2004).
100. See Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil.
Political,Economic, Social and CulturalRights, Including the Right to Development,

68, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/3 (Jan. 15, 2008) (by Manfred
Nowak, Special Rapporteur); see also Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women,

Its Causes and Consequences, Further Promotion and Encouragement of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Including the Question of the Programme and
Methods of Work of the Commission; Alternative Approaches and Ways and Means
Within the United Nations System from Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human

Rights and FundamentalFreedoms, 1 95, Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1996/53 (1996) (by Radhika Coomaraswamy, Special Rapporteur).
101. See, e.g., INGELSE, supra note 98, at 225; Bonita C. Meyersfeld,

ReconceptualizingDomestic Violence in InternationalLaw, 67 ALB. L. REV. 371, 400-

01 (2003).
102. Committee Against Torture, General Comment No. 2: Implementation of
Article 2 by States Parties, 18, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CG/2 (Jan. 24, 2008); see also, e.g.,
INGELSE, supra note 98, at 225; Meyersfeld, supra note 101, at 409-11.
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believe that acts of torture or ill-treatment are being committed by nonState officials."'o 3 Consequently, when the State knowingly fails to
prevent, investigate, prosecute, and punish, its failure to act may amount to
acquiescence in torture, as long as the elements of severity and
intentionality are present.
The obligations included in the CAT's interpretation are nearly identical
to the obligations included within the duty to ensure or secure human rights
that have already been recognized by the Inter-American System by way of
the theory of foreseeable risk. To accept CAT's interpretation would not
impose any new obligations on the States beyond those already found in
Lehanan and Cotton Field. For example, the European Court, in the case
of Opuz, even though it has not yet recognized that domestic violence may
constitute torture, held that the decision of a court to merely impose a small
fine on the husband and perpetrator of the violence "reveal[ed] a lack of
efficacy and a certain degree of tolerance." 04 It is now necessary for the
courts to move one step further and finally recognize that domestic
violence may constitute torture in certain instances.
That this approach holds a State responsible when it has acquiesced in an
act of torture does not necessarily mean that the State is responsible for the
actions of the private actor; rather, it means that the State is responsible for
its inactions as regards the private torture because the State was or should
have been aware of the severe case of domestic violence and did not act
reasonably to prevent it. Finally, this approach correctly signifies that the
only difference between torture and other inhuman and degrading treatment
is the severity of the act and serves to recognize that "private violence,"
often perpetrated against women, is no less deserving of international
judicial attention than the political violence in the public sphere typically
perpetrated against men.
CONCLUSION

The cases of Maria da Penha and Lenahan are just the tip of the iceberg
in the development of women's rights standards in the Inter-American
System. 05 This development first occurred within the Commission and
was evidenced in decisions of individual cases as well as "by the
Commission's publication of country reports, country chapters, and
thematic reports delving into priority themes for women in the Americas,
and the issuance of precautionary measures with a bearing on the rights of

103. Committee Against Torture, General Comment No. 2: Implementation of

Article 2 by States Parties, 18, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CG/2 (Jan. 24, 2008).
104. Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02, Eur. Ct. H.R., TT 169-70 (2009).
105. Celorio,supranote 50, at 823.
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women."106 The height of the progress of this evolution, so far, can be
found in the standards developed in the Cotton Field case.10 7 These
standards include the two principal differences between the analysis in
Maria da Penha and Lenahan: (1) the procedural obligations, and (2) the
theory of the foreseeable risk.
The application of the procedural obligations and of the theory of
foreseeable risk helped to reinforce the importance of State action in
preventing domestic violence. In addition, the case of Lenahan, in
particular, strengthened the importance of restraining orders and State
responsibility in enforcing them. There still are, however, some loose ends
that need to be resolved.108 For example, what happens if there is a
restraining order, but the victim does not call the police to inform them
there is a violation of that order? Does the restraining order itself constitute
sufficient notice to the State of the potential for severe domestic violence?
In most cases, it will not, but an analysis will need to be made in each case.
Furthermore, as previously elaborated, the application of the theory of
foreseeable risk signifies that when a State fails to prevent severe cases of
domestic violence, the lack of State action may amount to acquiescence to
torture. This recognition, in turn, implies that domestic violence, under
certain circumstances, rises to the level of ajus cogens violation and carries
with it the corresponding international obligations. Such a judicial
recognition might increase public awareness around the issue of domestic
violence and lead to a stronger condemnation of this type of violence.
Such social condemnation would serve to provide support to victims of
domestic violence and to empower victims to assert their legal rights.
Additionally, the qualification of domestic violence as torture lends support
to women's rights by proclaiming that the private sphere is as important as
the public sphere, and women's rights are as important as men's rights as
they are all human rights. Such an interpretation would serve to further
destroy the false dichotomy that relegates women to the private sphere,
unreachable by State and international judicial processes. As well, this
interpretation would go a long way towards eliminating the existing gender
bias in the traditional interpretation of the torture definition.

106. See id.
107. Id. at 819.
108. Id. at 854.

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2013

17

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 7

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol21/iss2/7

18

